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SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, PUBLIC SAFETY,
AND RECIDIVISM
Shira E. Gordon*
As of 2005, about 80,000 prisoners were housed in solitary confinement in jails
and in state and federal prisons in the United States. Prisoners in solitary confine-
ment are generally housed in a cell for twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day with
little human contact or interaction. The number of prisoners held in solitary con-
finement increased 40 percent between 1995 and 2000, in comparison to the
growth in the total prison population of 28 percent. Concurrently, the duration of
time that prisoners spend in solitary confinement also increased: nationally, most
prisoners in solitary confinement spend more than five years there. The effects of
solitary confinement on prisoners have been a source of growing concern, but the
question of whether solitary confinement affects public safety and recidivism has
received less attention. While lower courts have imposed constitutional limitations
on the use of solitary confinement, in the modern era the Supreme Court has never
held that the practice is unconstitutional. Therefore, this Note argues for policy
reforms to counteract the harmful impact of solitary confinement on public safety
and recidivism, informed by the constitutional standards for its use in prisons.
INTRODUCTION
As of 2005, about 80,000 prisoners were housed in solitary con-
finement in jails and in state and federal prisons in the United
States.1 In general, prisoners in solitary confinement are housed
“removed from sustained contact” with other people.2 While condi-
tions in solitary confinement can vary, prisoners are generally
housed in a cell for twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day “with little
human contact or interaction”; prisoners do not eat with others or
participate in group activities.3 They have little or no natural light,
reading material, television or radio access, property, or visitation
* J.D. candidate, May 2014, University of Michigan Law School; B.A., 2008, Barnard
College. I would like to thank Professor Margo Schlanger for her invaluable guidance and
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Note Editors Joanna Lampe and Emily Brown for
their feedback and edits.
1. Shane Bauer, Solitary in Iran Nearly Broke Me. Then I Went Inside America’s Prisons,
MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/solitary-
confinement-shane-bauer.
2. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of
Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 497 n.97 (1997)
(quoting Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 412, 420 (W.D.N.C. 1974)).
3. David Fathi, The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Confinement in the United States, in PRISON
LAW 2012, at 175, 178 (PLI Litig. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 234, 2012).
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rights.4 Sensory deprivation, where a prisoner’s access to anything
that stimulates the senses—for instance radio, television, and read-
ing material—is restricted makes the isolation drastically more
severe.5
There are different terms for solitary confinement, correspond-
ing to the varying purposes for which it is used. Prisoners who are
held in solitary confinement for their own protection are placed in
“protective custody,” whereas prisoners who are held in solitary con-
finement for the purposes of punishment or control are held in
“administrative” or “disciplinary segregation.”6 Protective custody
involves isolation for a prisoner’s own protection and is used on
both juvenile and adult prisoners. Often, jails place youth who are
charged as adults in “protective custody” in order to separate them
from adults “who can pose grave physical and emotional threats to
youth.”7 Juveniles are also sometimes held in disciplinary solitary
confinement.8 Traditional disciplinary segregation involves a brief
removal from the population that is meant to punish a prisoner for
a certain infraction.9 Conversely, in administrative segregation, pris-
oners are placed in solitary confinement for nonpunitive safety or
security reasons.10
The number of prisoners held in solitary confinement increased
40 percent between 1995 and 2000; in comparison, the total prison
population grew by 28 percent over the same period.11 Solitary con-
finement is now a “regular part of the rhythm of prison life.”12
In addition to being confined more frequently, the duration of
time that prisoners spend in solitary confinement has also in-
creased. One study of prisoners in New York reported an average
4. Id.
5. See id. at 179–80.
6. Margo Schlanger et al., ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, 25
CRIM. JUST. 14, 23 (2010).
7. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCARCERATING
YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 14 (2007), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice
.org/documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf.
8. See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GROWING UP
LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND PRISONS ACROSS THE UNITED
STATES 67 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/10/10/growing-locked-
down.
9. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 126 (2003).
10. Maureen L. O’Keefe, Administrative Segregation from Within, 88 PRISON J. 123, 123
(2008).
11. JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A RE-
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cumulative sentence in disciplinary solitary confinement of three
years for its prisoners.13 In the Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit in
California, prisoners are held for an average of seven and a half
years.14 Of the 1,126 prisoners in solitary confinement at Pelican
Bay, more than half have been there for at least five years.15 Eighty-
nine have been there for over twenty years and one has been in
solitary confinement for forty-two years.16
Demonstrating the trend toward solitary confinement’s increased
role in the American penal system is the development of the
“supermax” prison. Supermaxes are prisons in which all prisoners
are held in extreme isolation in long-term solitary confinement,
often because the prison system deems them to be gang members.17
Prisoners in supermaxes are completely isolated from other prison-
ers and guards.18 These prisons are designed to isolate prisoners
from any human contact: cells are purposefully solid so prisoners
cannot communicate through walls, and prison guards close the
doors with remote controls so the confined prisoner does not come
into contact with other prisoners.19 In supermax prisons, prisoners
can only exercise in “caged-in or cement-walled areas,” often called
“dog runs.”20 Prison officials recognize that these conditions are in-
humane, but some attempt to justify such treatment as deserved.
For instance, Don Poston, an administrator of the Estelle supermax
prison in Texas, has stated that, “It’s sad to say, but there are some
people who deserve to be treated like animals.”21 Although lower
courts have imposed constitutional limitations on the use of solitary
confinement, the Supreme Court in the modern era has never held
that solitary confinement is per se unconstitutional.
Solitary confinement’s effects on prisoners have been a source of
growing concern,22 but the question of whether solitary confine-
ment affects public safety and recidivism has received less attention.
13. THE CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCKDOWN NEW YORK: DISCIPLINARY CONFINEMENT
IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS 21–22 (2003), available at http://www.correctionalassociation
.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/lockdown-new-york_report.pdf.
14. Bauer, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Haney, supra note 9, at 126–27.
18. See Craig Haney, A Culture of Harm: Taming the Dynamics of Cruelty in Supermax Prisons,
35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 956, 968 (2008) (quoting Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 1096,
1098–99 (W.D. Wis. 2001)).
19. Id.
20. Haney, supra note 9, at 126.
21. Kevin Johnson, Serving Superhard Time: New Prisons Isolate Worst Inmates, USA TODAY,
Aug. 4, 1997, at A1.
22. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 1; Atul Gawande, Hellhole: The United States Holds Tens of
Thousands of Inmates in Long-Term Solitary Confinement. Is This Torture?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30,
498 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
This question is of growing importance because of the prevalence
and severity of solitary confinement practices in prisons across the
United States. Solitary confinement may cause prisoners to become
more dangerous because of the mental health consequences, the
lack of permitted activities, and the dehumanizing treatment by
some prison guards.23 While supporters of solitary confinement ar-
gue that it decreases recidivism by deterring prisoners from
committing future crimes,24 two studies—which matched prisoners
held in solitary confinement with those held in the general popula-
tion—found that solitary confinement increased recidivism.25
Because of the increasing prevalence and severity of solitary con-
finement and its potential effects on public safety and recidivism,
reform is needed. This Note, therefore, proposes policy reforms
that would limit time spent in solitary confinement and eliminate
sensory deprivation in order to remedy solitary confinement’s po-
tential negative effects on public safety and recidivism, informed by
the constitutional standards for its use in prisons. Part I provides a
historical overview of solitary confinement, explains its current
growth in the United States for adult and juvenile prisoners, and
examines its impact on prisoners’ mental health. Part II discusses
the constitutional status of solitary confinement under the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Part III demonstrates that solitary confinement is not
necessary in order to maintain safety within prisons. Part IV consid-
ers the tendency of solitary confinement to increase recidivism and
discusses potential models for changing solitary confinement. Part
V concludes by discussing a proposal for reform.
I. THE GROWING USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
This Part traces the original justifications for and ultimate draw-
backs of solitary confinement in the nineteenth century. It then
2009. Solitary confinement has also received negative attention due to its financial costs.
Building and operating supermax prisons can cost up to three times as much as normal
prisons, because prisoners are kept in single cells, the technological costs are greater, and
solitary confinement requires higher officer-to-prisoner ratios. Daniel P. Mears & William D.
Bales, Supermax Incarceration and Recidivism, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1131, 1135 (2009). In 2012, Illi-
nois Governor Pat Quinn initiated the closure of the Tamms Supermax Facility due to its
financial burden. Ed Yohnka, Closing Tamms Supermax: A Chance to Reevaluate Solitary Confine-
ment, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (June 21, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-
rights/closing-tamms-supermax-chance-reevaluate-solitary-confinement.
23. See Hans Toch, The Future of Supermax Confinement, 81 PRISON J. 376, 378, 382 (2001).
24. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1137.
25. See id. at 1149–51; David Lovell et al., Recidivism of Supermax Prisoners in Washington
State, 53 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 634, 649–50 (2007).
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discusses the reasons for solitary confinement’s increasing use in
American prisons, beginning in the 1980s. Finally, this Part outlines
the significant problems that accompany the widespread use of soli-
tary confinement for adults and juveniles.
A. Solitary Confinement in the Nineteenth Century
In the late eighteenth century, American reformers advocated
for solitary confinement because they hoped it would “give prison-
ers time to contemplate their sins . . . .”26 Dominant theory believed
that prisons could best rehabilitate prisoners “[b]y maximizing con-
trol” over them and isolating them from negative influences.27
Advocates believed that solitary confinement would rehabilitate the
prisoner through “reclamation” which would “effect ‘a deeper
change in the offender’s psyche’ than that produced by the rehabil-
itative aspects of mere hard labor.”28
Despite this initial optimism, commentators, as well as the Su-
preme Court, soon realized the dangers of solitary confinement. In
1833, de Toqueville and Beaumont reported that solitary confine-
ment “proved fatal for the majority of prisoners” at the Auburn
prison in New York; solitary confinement “devour[ed] the victim
incessantly and unmercifully; it does not reform, it kills.”29 In 1890,
The Supreme Court addressed solitary confinement in In re Med-
ley.30 The Court in Medley found that sentencing a murder convict to
solitary confinement prior to execution constituted an ex post facto
punishment above the statutory regime in place at the time of the
crime’s commission.31 In doing so, the Court recognized the severe
consequences of solitary confinement, writing that the practice
caused some prisoners to:
f[a]ll, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous con-
dition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them,
26. Keramet Ann Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary Con-
finement in U.S. Prisons, in 57 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 71, 72 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2012).
27. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 2, at 482.
28. Id. at 481 n.15 (quoting Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Crimi-
nal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1209 (1982)).
29. Reiter, supra note 26, at 78 (quoting GUSTAVE AUGUSTE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION TO
FRANCE 41 (S. Ill. Univ. Press 1979) (1833)).
30. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
31. Id. at 167–71.
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and others became violently insane, others, still, committed su-
icide, while others who stood the ordeal better were not
generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover suffi-
cient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
community.32
After the Court’s decision in In re Medley, solitary confinement lost
public approval as a legitimate form of punishment and was only
inflicted as a short-term punishment in response to misbehavior by
prisoners.33
B. The Modern Use of Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement is part of a general trend toward punish-
ment and the incapacitation of prisoners in the United States. A
“rapid expansion” in the United States prison population began in
the 1980s; this expansion resulted in “extreme overcrowding” and
precipitated the reimplementation of solitary confinement to deal
with resulting violence.34 Prison officials did not fix the worsening
prison conditions, which were a “source of behavioral problems.”35
Instead, correctional administrators implemented “aggressive poli-
cies” of solitary confinement in order to gain control over prisoners
and as a “weapon in th[e] war against unwieldy numbers of unruly
prisoners.”36 States began building technologically advanced
supermax prisons in which all prisoners are held in long-term soli-
tary confinement. California opened Pelican Bay, one of the first
supermax prisons, in 1988.37 By 1991, thirty-six states had built dedi-
cated supermax prisons,38 and in 2008 there were forty-four states
with supermax housing.39
Unlike the nineteenth century, correctional administrators in
modern prisons do not implement solitary confinement for rehabil-
itative purposes. The goals of modern solitary confinement are
simply to incapacitate and assert control over prisoners: the warden
and designers of the Tamms Supermax prison in Illinois, for in-
stance, described Tamms as “society’s latest, no-holds-barred effort
32. Id. at 168.
33. See Reiter, supra note 26, at 80.
34. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 2, at 491–92.
35. Id. at 493.
36. Id. at 480.
37. Keramet A. Reiter, Parole, Snitch, or Die: California’s Supermax Prisons and Prisoners,
1997–2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 530, 531 (2012).
38. Haney & Lynch, supra note 2, at 480.
39. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1132.
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to ensure that certain predatory people are isolated from the rest of
us, and from each other.”40 This emphasis is consistent with the
general evolution of the American prison’s mission: since the nine-
teenth century, the purpose of incarceration has transitioned from
rehabilitation to “command and control.”41
The increased use of solitary confinement has been predicated
on its supposed benefits to prisons, but there has been little discus-
sion of the effects of solitary confinement on prisoners’ interactions
with society after they have been released. Most prisoners—includ-
ing prisoners in solitary confinement—will eventually be released
from prison:  indeed, overall more than 93 percent of prisoners will
eventually rejoin society.42
Large numbers of prisoners are in fact released directly from soli-
tary confinement into communities.43 Prisoners may be released
directly from solitary confinement if they are given “indeterminate
terms” in solitary confinement when prison officials find the pris-
oner to be dangerous or a gang member.44 Prisoners who are
released from solitary confinement directly into communities often
have difficulty adjusting to “natural light, the noise of traffic and
conversation, and physical, human contact.”45 Similarly, prisoners
released from solitary confinement into the general prison popula-
tion often experience “great difficulty controlling their tempers”
40. Robert Sheppard et al., Closed Maximum Security: The Illinois SuperMax, 58 CORREC-
TIONS TODAY 84, 84 (1996).
41. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF
AMERICA’S PRISONS 27 (2006), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpew
trustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America
_Prisons%20.pdf.
In the mid-1970s, the United States formally abandoned its commitment to the reha-
bilitative ideals that had guided its prison policy for decades. Often at the insistence of
the politicians who funded their prison systems, correctional administrators embraced
a new philosophy built on the notion that incarceration was intended to inflict punish-
ment and little else.
Haney, supra note 9, at 128.
42. Haney, supra note 18, at 979–80
43. Fathi, supra note 3, at 188. In California and Colorado, 40 percent of prisoners in
solitary confinement are released directly into communities. Id. California releases an aver-
age of 909 prisoners each year directly from solitary confinement in the Security Housing
Units at Pelican Bay and Corcoran prisons. Reiter, supra note 37, at 552–53. In 2005, Texas
released 1,458 prisoners directly from solitary confinement. Laura Sullivan, In US Prisons
Thousands Spend Years in Isolation, NPR (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=5582144.
44. Haney, supra note 9, at 127. In order for gang members to be released from solitary
confinement into the general prison population, they must renounce their gang member-
ship and “debrief” or “snitch.” Reiter, supra note 37, at 536; see Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp.
1146, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing the “debriefing” process in California prisons).
45. Reiter, supra note 37, at 553.
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because of the “anger that has been mounting” during their time in
solitary confinement.46
Because of these problems of transition, some prison experts
have argued that prison officials should shift their focus from sim-
ple isolation in prison to preparing prisoners “to succeed at ‘going
straight’ once they are released.”47 Despite the broader focus on
punishing prisoners, there have been some recent efforts to imple-
ment more rehabilitative prison policies.48
C. Solitary Confinement of Juveniles
The juvenile justice system was created in the early nineteenth
century when “[r]eformers realized that nobody’s interests were
served by traumatizing children, sometimes irreparably,” in the
adult criminal justice system.49 However, juveniles who are charged
as adults are incarcerated in adult jails and prisons in a majority of
jurisdictions throughout the United States.50 In those situations, the
juveniles are generally held in protective custody in order to sepa-
rate them from adults.51 The conditions of protective custody
mirror those of punitive and administrative solitary confinement:
juveniles are locked down twenty-three to twenty-four hours a day in
a small cell without natural light, “verbal contact” with other prison-
ers, or “meaningful contact with staff.”52
Solitary confinement is both unnecessary and harmful for youth.
National correctional standards, juvenile justice experts, and social
scientists agree that isolation in solitary confinement is an “ineffec-
tive therapeutic tool” that harms juveniles and is “normally
unnecessary” in juvenile facilities.53
46. Terry A. Kupers, What to Do With the Survivors?, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005, 1010
(2008).
47. Id. at 1014.
48. See Haney, supra note 18, at 979–80 (arguing that, despite the “culture of control”
and the “penal harm movement” that has harmed both prisoners and correctional officers,
there is a growing commitment to the goal of rehabilitation).
49. CAROLINE ISAACS & MATTHEW LOWEN, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., BURIED ALIVE: SOLI-
TARY CONFINEMENT IN ARIZONA’S PRISONS AND JAILS 43 (2007).
50. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 2. Juveniles are
charged as adults because of the “political stereotype” that teenagers who commit crimes
“must be as sophisticated as an adult.” CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 14
(quoting Matt Olson, Kids in the Hole, 67 THE PROGRESSIVE 26, 27 (2003)). However, these
children are “most often younger than their age emotionally.” Olson, supra.
51. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 14.
52. Id.
53. ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 43 (citing Kenneth Zimmerman et al., Letter to
Valerie Egar, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey (2005)).
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Solitary confinement can make it impossible for juveniles to de-
velop a healthy, functioning adult social identity because they are
still in an “uncertain, unformed state of social identity.”54 Authori-
ties also report high rates of suicide for juveniles held in solitary
confinement.55 Between 1995 and 1999, 110 juvenile suicides oc-
curred in juvenile correctional and detention facilities.56 Half of the
victims were on “room confinement status”57 at the time of suicide,
and 62 percent of the victims had a history of room confinement.58
These rates may show that prisons do not adequately address the
mental health effects of solitary confinement on juveniles. It is also
possible that mentally ill juveniles are disproportionately placed in
solitary confinement, that solitary confinement exacerbates or
causes mental illness in juveniles, or that a combination of these
factors contributes to the high suicide rates. Reform is necessary
because of the widespread use of solitary confinement for juveniles
and its detrimental effects on their mental health.
D. The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners’ Mental Health
1. Lack of Adequate Mental Health Treatment
Prisoners housed in solitary confinement often do not receive
adequate mental health treatment, which is troubling not least be-
cause a disproportionate number of prisoners with mental illness
are housed in solitary confinement, and such confinement both ex-
acerbates and causes mental illness.59 A large number of mentally ill
prisoners are placed in solitary confinement because—due to
mental illness, brain damage, or other factors—such prisoners
often have difficulty conforming to prison rules.60 In a Washington
State study, researchers found that mentally ill prisoners were more
than four times more likely than other prisoners to have been held
54. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 14 (quoting Olson, supra note 50, at
27).
55. ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 44.
56. Id. (citing LINDSAY M. HAYES, JUVENILE SUICIDE IN CONFINEMENT: A NATIONAL SURVEY
10 (Feb. 2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/206354.pdf).
57. The study included solitary confinement, time-outs, and confinement in a quiet
room during waking hours in its definition of “room confinement.” HAYES, supra note 56, at
28.
58. ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 44 (citing HAYES, supra note 56, at 24).
59. Haney, supra note 9, at 132.
60. Lovell et al., supra note 25, at 634.
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in solitary confinement.61 The American Friends Service Commit-
tee (AFSC), in a separate study, found that 26 percent of prisoners
held in Arizona’s supermax prisons were mentally ill, compared to
16.8 percent of the state’s general prison population.62 AFSC ex-
plained that these findings reflect the “higher likelihood of
prisoners with untreated mental illness receiving disciplinary write-
ups for behaviors associated with their symptoms.”63
Despite the large numbers of prisoners with mental illness held
there, prisoners in solitary confinement receive psychiatric treat-
ment very infrequently; depending on the prison, prisoners may
only be evaluated every ninety days.64 Those in solitary confinement
who are mentally ill or who become mentally ill (and therefore
need treatment the most) do not receive it. Their behaviors are
viewed as disciplinary problems rather than as symptoms of mental
illness. To the extent that prisoners do receive treatment, they are
not evaluated confidentially or out of earshot of other prisoners
and staff.65
2. Solitary Confinement Can Exacerbate and Cause
Mental Illness in Prisoners
Solitary confinement can exacerbate mental illness for prisoners
who are already mentally ill. In Madrid v. Gomez, the Northern Dis-
trict of California analogized that housing mentally ill prisoners in
solitary confinement “is the mental equivalent of putting an asth-
matic in a place with little air.”66 Indeed, some studies have shown
that solitary confinement is countertherapeutic.  Linda Finke,
Ph.D, RN, in her study of isolation for adults and children in psychi-
atric hospitals, found that the use of seclusion or isolation “may
cause additional trauma and harm.”67 Furthermore, the study
found that “seclusion does not add to therapeutic goals and is in
61. Id. at 642.
62. MATTHEW LOWEN & CAROLINE ISAACS, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., LIFETIME
LOCKDOWN: HOW ISOLATION CONDITIONS IMPACT PRISONER REENTRY 8 (2012).
63. Id.
64. Kupers, supra note 46, at 1010.
65. Id.
66. 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In Madrid, the court ordered that mentally
ill prisoners be removed from solitary confinement in the Security Housing Unit because “a
severe reduction in environmental stimulation and social interaction can have serious psychi-
atric consequences for some people.” Id. at 1231–32.
67. See Linda M. Finke, The Use of Seclusion Is Not Evidence-Based Practice, 14 J. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 186, 189 (2001).
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fact a method to control the environment instead of a therapeutic
intervention.”68
Moreover, solitary confinement causes harmful psychological ef-
fects for prisoners who did not previously suffer from mental
illness. Professor Craig Haney reviewed studies of solitary confine-
ment and found that, in every published study of solitary
confinement where participants were held in “nonvoluntary con-
finement” for more than ten days and were “unable to terminate
their isolation at will,” the participants experienced negative psy-
chological effects.69 Although these psychological effects ranged in
severity, participants suffered “clinically significant symptoms,” in-
cluding “hypertension, uncontrollable anger, hallucinations,
emotional breakdowns, chronic depression, and suicidal thoughts
and behavior.”70
Haney identified five social pathologies that are caused by soli-
tary confinement and that provide explanations for these
psychological effects. First, the “unprecedented totality of control”
in solitary confinement forces prisoners to become completely de-
pendent on the prison for all aspects of their lives.71 Many prisoners
become unable to “initiate or to control their own behavior, or to
organize their own lives.”72 Second, prisoners may become unable
to structure their lives around activity and purpose, because they no
longer have any opportunities to do so.73 These prisoners experi-
ence “[c]hronic apathy, lethargy, depression, and despair.”74 Third,
solitary confinement “undermin[es]” prisoners’ “sense of self” be-
cause they lose the opportunity to socially construct their identity
through “regular, normal interpersonal contact,” thus “creat[ing] a
feeling of unreality.”75 Prisoners in solitary confinement risk “losing
their grasp” on their own identity and connection to a “larger social
world.”76 Fourth, the total isolation of solitary confinement can lead
some prisoners to become “disoriented and even frightened” by so-
cial contact and interaction.77 Fifth, “the deprivations, restrictions,
68. See id.
69. Haney, supra note 9, at 132; see also Kupers, supra note 46, at 1005–06 (“[I]t is very
clear . . . that for just about all prisoners, being held in isolated confinement for longer than
3 months causes lasting emotional damage if not full-blown psychosis and functional
disability.”).
70. Haney, supra note 9, at 132.





76. Id.; see also Haney & Lynch, supra note 2, at 503 (“[W]e look to others and in them
see identity-forming reflections of ourselves.”).
77. Haney, supra note 9, at 140.
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the totality of control, and the prolonged absence of any real op-
portunity for happiness or joy” result in “intolerable levels of
frustration” in some prisoners, which can lead to anger and “uncon-
trollable and sudden outbursts of rage.”78 Haney concluded that
these adaptations are “dysfunctional and problematic.”79
Prisons have not adequately responded to the mental health de-
terioration of prisoners in solitary confinement. Solitary
confinement causes mental illness and anger, which can result in a
“vicious cycle—the prisoner becoming more angry and incapable of
controlling his temper and the resulting disciplinary tickets leading
to more time in the isolation setting that induces the angry behav-
iors.”80 Prisoners in solitary confinement who exhibit signs of
mental illness such as refusing an order, self-mutilation or cutting,
or expressing anger at officers likewise receive disciplinary sanc-
tions rather than treatment.81 Even suicidal behavior is sometimes
treated as a behavioral rather than psychological problem.82 When
prisoners in solitary confinement “become so acutely ill” that they
are brought to a psychiatric hospital, the prisoners are returned to
solitary confinement when they recover, causing a “revolving door
phenomenon.”83
3. Solitary Confinement’s Impact on Prisoners’ Mental Health
Affects Their Potential for Successful Reentry
Due to the psychological effects of solitary confinement, prison-
ers held in such conditions may be unable to “exercise increased
self-control and self-initiative” if they are released into the general
population of a prison or into communities.84 Additionally, prison-
ers may not be able to recover after their release because these
harmful adaptations may “become too ingrained to relinquish.”85
The severe mental health deterioration and the lack of mental
health treatment associated with solitary confinement suggest that
78. Id.
79. Id. at 139.
80. Kupers, supra note 46, at 1012.
81. Id.
82. The American Friends Service Committee reported that “some correctional employ-
ees seek to punish the youth for their mental illness, viewing suicide threats as behavioral
problems rather than as mental health crises requiring therapeutic intervention.” ISAACS &
LOWEN, supra note 49, at 44.
83. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 60.
84. Haney, supra note 9, at 140.
85. Id. at 141.
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prisoners may suffer prolonged mental illness after they are re-
leased. In turn, these prisoners might pose an increased risk to
public safety after their release. The “paranoia and social anxiety”
that result from solitary confinement mean that prisoners may have
more difficulty “getting their bearings during the first few months”
after they are released from prison, when they are at the greatest
risk of reoffending.86
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitu-
tion limit which types of prisoners can be placed in solitary
confinement and the time they can be held there and require that
prisoners receive sufficient due process before and during their
confinement. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
requires that prison officials provide prisoners due process of law
prior to placing them in significantly harsher conditions than con-
finement in the general prison population.87 However, many
limitations on prisoners’ privileges and rights are seen as a permissi-
ble aspect of the penal system and of a prisoner’s sentence and are
therefore not subject to due process protections.88 The Eighth
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.89 Courts in
some circumstances have found that the solitary confinement of
severely mentally ill prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment90
86. Lovell et al., supra note 25, at 635.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005).
88. See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977)
(“[L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privi-
leges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”)
(quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
90. Fathi, supra note 3, at 185 (citing Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex.
1999), rev’d on other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001), adhered to on remand, 154 F. Supp.
2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (“Conditions in TDCJ-ID’s administrative segregation units clearly
violate constitutional standards when imposed on the subgroup of the plaintiffs’ class made
up of mentally-ill prisoners.”); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1300 & n.15, 1301 &
n.16, 1320–21 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that housing prisoners with serious mental disor-
ders—defined as schizophrenia, bipolar disorders, and major depression or an inability to
function in prison life without psychiatric intervention—in administrative segregation vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1231–32, 1265–66 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (removing mentally ill prisoners from the Special Housing Unit because the court
found that “a severe reduction in environmental stimulation and social interaction can have
serious psychiatric consequences for some people”); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477,
1515–16, 1531–34, 1548–50 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that confinement of seriously mentally
ill prisoners—including prisoners suffering from self-abusive behavior, psychosis, paranoid
schizophrenia, and depression—in lockdown for more than three days instead of providing
mental health treatment violated the Eighth Amendment); Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp.
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and have affirmed time limits for the duration of solitary confine-
ment.91
A. Challenges to Solitary Confinement Under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause
The most successful challenges to solitary confinement have
been brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, which dictates that the government cannot “physically pun-
ish an individual except in accordance with due process of law.”92
Because of the hardship inherently imposed by solitary confine-
ment, the Due Process Clause limits its use by requiring that
prisoners receive reviews prior to, and during, their placement in
solitary confinement.
Therefore, in challenges under the Due Process Clause, prison-
ers claim that they did not receive sufficient process prior to their
placement in solitary confinement.93 Due process challenges do not
address the underlying problems of solitary confinement because
they generally demand only increased hearings and reviews.94 How-
ever, these cases implicate the Eighth Amendment because, in
order to find a due process violation, courts must find that solitary
confinement imposes an “atypical and significant hardship”95 on a
prisoner in comparison to normal prison confinement.
Since the 1970s, circuit courts have found that placement in soli-
tary confinement might “involve [such] grievous loss” that it
requires due process.96 In Twomey, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
prisons’ argument that the Due Process Clause does not require
any procedural safeguards “for purely internal prison disciplinary
matters”97 and found that prisoners placed in solitary confinement
for two to four months were entitled to procedural safeguards.98
More recent circuit court cases have found solitary confinement of
522, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that evidence of prison officials’ failure to screen out from
solitary confinement “those individuals who, by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to
be severely and adversely affected by placement there” states an Eighth Amendment claim);
see also Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-071, Doc. 134, at *27 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2001)
(order granting preliminary injunction prohibiting the placement of seriously mentally ill
prisoners at the Ohio Supermax).
91. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 684 (1978).
92. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
93. See Austin, 545 U.S. at 223.
94. See Id.
95. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
96. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 717 (7th Cir. 1973)
97. Id. at 716.
98. Id. at 708, 718.
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305 days or more to be an “atypical and significant hardship” that
requires due process.99
The United States Supreme Court has only considered the con-
stitutionality100 of long-term solitary confinement once, in Wilkinson
v. Austin.101 In that case, the plaintiffs had been in extreme isolation
in the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), a supermax facility. Prisoners
were placed in OSP if they were convicted of certain offenses, such
as organized crime, or if they engaged in certain misconduct while
in prison.102 The prisoners held in OSP lost parole eligibility, were
held in indefinite solitary detention, and had almost no human
contact.103
The Court in Austin explained that prohibiting “almost all
human contact” created an “atypical and significant” hardship
when compared to “any plausible baseline” within the Ohio prison
system.104 However, the Court held that, despite its infliction of
hardship, solitary confinement in the case of the plaintiff prisoners
did not violate their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights be-
cause the state “provide[d] multiple levels of review” prior to its
imposition.105
B. The Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition on
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Solitary confinement may also violate prisoners’ rights under the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In analyzing the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment, the Supreme Court first considers “objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.”106 Although
courts expect that prison conditions are “restrictive and even harsh”
99. See, e.g., Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230–32 (2d Cir. 2000) (305 days in segre-
gated housing unit); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143–44 (3d Cir. 2000) (eight years in
segregation); Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (one year in solitary
confinement); Herron v. Schriro, 11 F. App’x 659, 661–62 (8th Cir. 2001) (thirteen years in
segregation).
100. The Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of long-term solitary confine-
ment only under the Due Process Clause, and not under the Eighth Amendment. The
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims had settled in the District Court. Wilkinson v. Austin,
545 U.S. 209, 218 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 216–17.
103. Id. at 214–15.
104. Id. at 223.
105. Id. at 227.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (death
penalty).
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as “part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their of-
fenses,” prison conditions may not “deprive inmates of the minimal
civilized measures of life’s necessities.”107 A successful Eighth
Amendment claim must be based on specific actions that “pro-
duce[ ] the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need”
rather than “amorphous . . . overall conditions.”108 For example,
under the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must not deprive
prisoners of specific needs such as food, warmth, and exercise.109
In addition to considering whether prisoners’ needs are being
met, the Supreme Court also considers whether harsh prison condi-
tions are necessary and serve a penological purpose.110 The first
prong of this analysis asks whether the prison regulation “bears a
rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it.”111 The second prong asks if the regulation “in-
volve[s] the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain” or is
“grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting im-
prisonment.”112 Even if a regulation meets the first prong, it violates
the Eighth Amendment if it fails the second.
This standard, while objective, is not static; the Supreme Court
recognizes that this Eighth Amendment standard changes as society
progresses. These “evolving standards of decency . . . mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.”113 Furthermore, this objective
component can be satisfied even if a prisoner has not yet been
harmed: the Supreme Court has explained that prison officials can-
not “ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to
cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month
or year.”114
After a prisoner has demonstrated an objective violation of the
Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must also show that, subjectively,
prison officials were “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to a substantial
risk of serious harm . . . .”115 In the medical context, for example, it
is not enough to establish that a prison official should have known
107. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
108. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1991).
109. Id. In Madrid v. Gomez, the court found that prisoners with a history of mental illness
were deprived of the need for mental health when placed in solitary confinement because of
the “severe psychological consequences” that would “most probably” result. 889 F. Supp.
1146, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
110. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1428 (11th Cir. 1987).
111. Andrea Lyon & Mark D. Cunningham, “Reason Not the Need”: Does the Lack of Compel-
ling State Interest in Maintaining a Separate Death Row Make It Unlawful?, 33 AM. J. L. 1, 12
(2005) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 89 (1987)).
112. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
113. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
114. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
115. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
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of a prisoner’s serious medical need.116 In order to establish a
prison official’s deliberate indifference, a prisoner-plaintiff must
show evidence that the official was actually aware of a prisoner’s seri-
ous need and chose to ignore it.117 In addition to showing how a
prisoner was harmed by prison conditions, a successful Eighth
Amendment claim must also show culpability by prison officials.
C. The Eighth Amendment’s Limitations on Solitary Confinement
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the harm of solitary
confinement in In re Medley,118 the Court has not found that long-
term solitary confinement constitutes a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment.119 Federal courts have held that solitary con-
finement cannot be used to punish prisoners for the crimes they
committed prior to conviction120 and that excessively long-term soli-
tary confinement can violate the Eighth Amendment.121 Decisions
have also restricted the use of solitary confinement for mentally ill
prisoners.122 Despite these restrictions, courts have refused to find
that solitary confinement is per se unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court first established that solitary confinement is
a “form of punishment subject to scrutiny” under the Eighth
116. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
117. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839.
118. 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890); see also supra Part I.A. (discussing the Court’s early criti-
cisms of solitary confinement).
119. Reiter, supra note 26, at 80; see, e.g., McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 158–60 (1891)
(holding that solitary confinement prior to execution did not violate the Eighth
Amendment).
120. United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2000). In litigation following
the Supreme Court decision in Wilkinson v. Austin, the district court found that the prisoners’
due process rights were violated because they were being confined in the supermax based on
their original offense and not based on their behavior while confined in the supermax. Aus-
tin v. Wilkinson (Austin VII), No. 4:01-CV-71, 2007 WL 2840352, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27,
2007).
121. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (“Confinement in a prison or in an
isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards.”).
122. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (removing
mentally ill prisoners—such as prisoners with “borderline personality disorders, brain dam-
age or mental retardation, impulse-ridden personalities, or a history of prior psychiatric
problems or chronic depression”—from the Special Housing Unit because the court found
that these prisoners were at a “particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury
to their mental health”); Austin, No. 4:01-CV-071, Doc. 134, at *16–18, *27 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
21, 2001) (order granting preliminary injunction prohibiting the placement of prisoners
with serious mental illnesses—such as schizophrenia, chronic depression, antisocial personal-
ity disorder, and major depressive disorder—at the Ohio Supermax).
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Amendment in Hutto v. Finney.123 That opinion recognized that the
Eighth Amendment “prohibits penalties that are grossly dispropor-
tionate to the offense,” as well as punishments that violate “today’s
‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, hu-
manity, and decency.’”124 The Hutto Court found that the
constitutionality of solitary confinement depends on the length of
the confinement and on its particular conditions.125 The Court af-
firmed the District Court’s decision limiting the length of time that
a prisoner could be held in solitary confinement to thirty days.126
This precedent suggests that long-term solitary confinement may
violate the Eighth Amendment.
Lower federal courts have further defined constitutional limits
on solitary confinement. In Davenport v. DeRobertis, the Seventh Cir-
cuit recognized that isolating a prisoner from others for years or
even months can cause substantial psychological damage and may
violate the Eighth Amendment.127 However, in that decision Judge
Posner made clear that the prohibition on “‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ is relative rather than absolute.”128 Judge Posner anal-
ogized prison conditions to the poverty line in that, as society’s
standards of living improve, “the standard of minimum decency of
prison conditions, like the poverty line, rises too.”129 Therefore, a
court may find a correctional practice that had previously been up-
held to be unconstitutional due to increased knowledge of its
harmfulness or because society has developed less-harmful methods
of addressing the problem.
Courts have also found that solitary confinement violates the
Eighth Amendment for severely mentally ill prisoners. David Fathi,
Director of the ACLU’s National Prison Project, found that every
federal court that has considered claims by severely mentally ill130
123. 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978). Although the Supreme Court critiqued solitary confine-
ment in In re Medley, the Supreme Court found that the conditions violated the prisoner’s ex
post facto rights. 134 U.S. 160, 166 (1890). The prisoner did not raise Eighth Amendment
claims in In re Medley because that case was a petition for habeas corpus.
124. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
125. Id. at 685–86 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id. at 684.
127. Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
908 (1988). In Davenport, Judge Posner affirmed the District Court’s order that the Eighth
Amendment required prisoners segregated for ninety days or more to be allowed at least five
hours of out-of-cell exercise per week. Id. at 1314–15. However, the court found that the
Eighth Amendment did not require that prisoners be allowed three showers per week. Id. at
1316.
128. Id. at 1315.
129. Id.
130. According to Haney, the prisoners at the greatest risk of suffering permanent harm
from solitary confinement are those who are “emotionally unstable, who suffer from clinical
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prisoners held in solitary confinement has found this treatment un-
constitutional.131 For example, in Jones ‘El v. Berge, the Western
District of Wisconsin granted an injunction prohibiting the housing
of mentally ill prisoners in the Boscobel supermax.132 The court ex-
plained that the prison’s faulty procedures for screening mentally
ill prisoners “support a finding of deliberate indifference” in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment and the “serious risk of harm” the
procedures posed to mentally ill prisoners was unconstitutional.133
Similarly, in Madrid v. Gomez, the Northern District of California
found that, if conditions of solitary confinement “inflict a serious
mental illness, greatly exacerbate mental illness, or deprive inmates
of their sanity,” they thereby “depriv[e] inmates of a basic necessity
of human existence.”134
Despite these cases, courts have not found solitary confinement
to be per se unconstitutional for prisoners who are not mentally ill.
The district court in Madrid, for instance, did not find long-term
solitary confinement unconstitutional for all prisoners because the
“generalized ‘psychological pain’—i.e. the loneliness, frustration,
depression or extreme boredom”—that prisoners may experience
in solitary confinement is not sufficiently cruel and unusual to be
unconstitutional.135
depression or other mood disorders, who are developmentally disabled, and those whose
contact with reality is already tenuous.” Haney, supra note 9, at 142.
131. Fathi, supra note 3, at 185 (citing Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex.
1999), rev’d on other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001), adhered to on remand, 154 F. Supp.
2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320–21 (E.D. Cal. 1995);
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1231–32, 1265–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Casey v. Lewis, 834
F. Supp. 1477, 1549–50 (D. Ariz. 1993); Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); see also Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-00071-JG, Doc. 134, at *27 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
21, 2001) (order granting preliminary injunction prohibiting the placement of seriously
mentally ill prisoners at the Ohio Supermax).
132. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1125 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
133. Id.
134. 889 F. Supp. at 1264.
135. Id. at 1263. One reason courts may consider that the risk of psychiatric harm to
prisoners who are not mentally ill is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation is
section 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That section states that “ ‘[n]o Federal
civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.’” Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement
and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 133 (2008) (quoting Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-103, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e)). This provision reflects the view that “claims for mental and emotional injuries
are seen as easily feigned or exaggerated.” Id.
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III. THE IMPACT OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON
VIOLENCE IN PRISONS
Ironically, most prisoners housed in solitary confinement are not
the “worst of the worst,” or the most dangerous or violent.136 In-
deed, many prisoners are housed in solitary confinement because
they are mentally ill or are “nuisance prisoners” who break minor
rules.137 For example, 35 percent of prisoners in Arizona’s maxi-
mum-security units were convicted of nonviolent offenses.138
Even when prisoners are placed in solitary confinement based on
their violent behavior, however, this behavior is not always clearly
distinguishable from that of prisoners in the general population. In
an empirical study of solitary confinement, Mears and Bales paired
Florida prisoners held in solitary confinement with those in the
general population based on “past offending record, current of-
fense, and behavior while incarcerated.”139 The matching process
resulted in a “non-supermax group that did not differ statistically”
in age, race, criminal history, and disciplinary record from the
supermax group.140 While Florida’s policy called for housing pris-
oners in solitary confinement when they had been convicted of
“violent or serious crimes or . . . engaged in violent or disruptive
behavior,”141 Mears and Bales found that “more prisoners are eligi-
ble for supermax housing in Florida than end up in it,” because the
number of prisoners in supermax housing does not fluctuate, “the
criteria for supermax placement are largely open ended” and
“cover a wide range of possible behaviors that could implicate large
swaths of the inmate population,” and they were able to match the
prisoners in supermax with prisoners in the general population.142
Mears and Bales’s study suggests that behavior-based assignment to
solitary confinement can be somewhat arbitrary, meaning that the
most violent prisoners may not be the ones in solitary confinement.
136. Fathi, supra note 3, at 185.
137. Id. at 186.
138. LOWEN & ISAACS supra note 62, at 14.
139. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1144.
140. Id. at 1149.
141. Id. at 1143.
142. Id. at 1143–44. In Florida, prisoners are held in solitary confinement for:
committing murder and assault, instigating a riot or disorder, causing more than
$1,000 in property damage, escaping or attempting to escape, possessing weapons or
drugs, and, more generally, exhibiting behaviors “that threaten the safety of others,
threaten the security of the institution, or demonstrate an inability to live in the gen-
eral population without abusing the rights and privileges of others.”
Id. at 1143 (internal citations omitted).
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Solitary confinement has not come close to solving the very prob-
lem it was meant to reduce: prison violence.143 For example, a 2012
study showed that the “rate of violent incidents” in California pris-
ons is almost 20 percent higher than when the Pelican Bay
supermax prison—California’s first supermax—opened in 1989.144
Studies have shown that supermax prisons have little effect on pris-
oner-on-prisoner violence145 and that there is only mixed support
for the view that supermax prisons increase safety for prison
guards.146
In fact, solitary confinement may even result in increased violence
in prisons. The Vera Commission147 explained that “[t]here is
troubling evidence that the distress of living and working in this
environment actually causes violence between staff and prison-
ers.”148 In Toussaint v. McCarthy, the Northern District of California
found that segregation, with its idleness and lack of programmed
activity, “spawn[ed] tension and violence; [and] it increase[d]
rather than decrease[d] antisocial tendencies among inmates” in
California’s San Quentin and Folsom prisons.149 Similarly, Don Ca-
bana, the warden of Parchman Prison in Mississippi, explained:
“we’re taking some bad folks, and we’re making them even worse.
We’re making them meaner.”150
Long-term solitary confinement is unnecessary. In the past, insti-
tutions achieved control over prisoners through less-restrictive
means.  Recently, several states have successfully reduced the num-
ber of prisoners in solitary confinement without compromising
security. “There is no evidence” that today’s violent prisoners “are
143. See Sheppard et al., supra note 40, at 84.
144. Bauer, supra note 1.
145. Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate Levels of
Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1365–67 (2003) (finding that opening the Tamms
Supermax prison in Illinois, the SMU I and II in Arizona, and the OPH in Minnesota did not
decrease inmate-on-inmate violence in these states); see also Haney, supra note 18, at 980
(“Supermax has proliferated despite empirical evidence suggesting that its existence has
done little or nothing to reduce systemwide prison disorder or disciplinary infractions . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted).
146. Briggs et al., supra note 145, at 1365–67. Prisoner assaults on staff decreased in Illi-
nois after the Tamms supermax was built. Id. However, staff injuries increased following the
opening of the SMU II in Arizona. Id. Finally, opening the OPH in Minnesota and the SMU I
in Arizona did not impact violence toward staff. Id.
147. The Vera Institute of Justice created the Commission on Safety and Abuse in
America’s Prisons, chaired by the Honorable John J. Gibbons and former Attorney General
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, which issued recommendations on prison reform, including soli-
tary confinement.
148. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 14.
149. 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986).
150. ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 35.
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any worse than those who had been adequately managed by less
drastic measures in the past.”151
In fact, Colorado, Maine, and Mississippi have reduced the num-
bers of prisoners in solitary confinement without an increase in
prison violence.152 Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, for
example, experienced a 50 percent decrease in violence after it
transferred 75 percent of its solitary confinement prisoners in the
mid-2000s.153 The State transferred most of these prisoners into the
general prison population and transferred prisoners with serious
mental illness to a psychiatric hospital or to a step-down mental
health treatment program.154 After these changes, there was a
“marked decrease of violence” throughout Mississippi’s Depart-
ment of Corrections and a “stunning decrease in the number of
disciplinary infractions . . . given to prisoners suffering from serious
mental illness.”155
One explanation for why nonviolent prisoners are held in soli-
tary confinement is that states built supermax prisons because of a
“desire to appear ‘tough on crime’” and then needed to find pris-
oners to house in them.156 Despite its purpose—to make the state
appear as if it is keeping its citizens safe—solitary confinement actu-
ally deals a blow to societal safety concerns.
IV. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND RECIDIVISM
Prisoner recidivism is a serious public safety concern: almost
700,000 prisoners are released from prison every year,157 and ap-
proximately two-thirds of those released are rearrested within three
151. Haney, supra note 9, at 129.
152. Bauer, supra note 1.
153. Id. (citing Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety
Consequences Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Judici-
ary Comm., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Christopher B. Epps, Comm’r of Corrections
for the State of Mississippi), available at http://www.motherjones.com/documents/452652-
epps-testimony#document/p3/a76665). Dr. James Austin, a classification expert, had con-
cluded that almost 80 percent of the prisoners held in Unit 32 at Parchman should be
transferred from solitary confinement in administrative segregation into the general prison
population. Terry A. Kupers et al., Beyond Supermax Administrative Segregation, 36 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 1037, 1040 (2009).
154. See Kupers, et al., supra note 153, at 1042–43 (discussing the process by which these
prisoners were released from solitary confinement into the step-down mental health program
and then into general population after three to six months).
155. Terry A. Kupers, Treating Those Excluded from the SHU, 12 CORRECTIONAL MENTAL
HEALTH REP. 49, 50 (2010).
156. Fathi, supra note 3, at 185.
157. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2011 1 (2012). 688,384 state and federal prisoners were released in 2011. Id.
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years.158 While there are multiple theories for why solitary confine-
ment would increase or decrease recidivism, there are few
quantitative studies on solitary confinement and recidivism, in part
because some states do not release data on recidivism rates of pris-
oners held in solitary confinement.159 Based on factors discussed
below, however, spending time in solitary confinement may actually
increase an individual’s risk of recidivism.
A. Recidivism for General Population Prisoners
and Access to Rehabilitation
Education and work programming,160 maintenance of family ties
during incarceration,161 and assistance transitioning into society
post-release162 are all factors known to decrease recidivism. Simi-
larly, placement in community-based programs instead of detention
decreases recidivism for juveniles.163
States that have reduced their recidivism rates have often done so
by implementing programs that help prisoners transition from in-
carceration to release. For example, Michigan launched the
Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative (MPRI) in 2003 and expanded
the program statewide in 2008.164 Under this program, prior to re-
lease, prisoners are transferred from prison to a reentry facility
where a transition plan is created in order to “address[ ] employ-
ment, housing, transportation, mentoring, counseling, and any
necessary treatment for mental illness or addictions.”165 Parolees
who participated in MPRI were reincarcerated at one-third the rate
of similar offenders who did not participate in MPRI.166 Similarly,
Oregon dropped its recidivism rate by implementing “detailed tran-
sition planning” for prisoners in the six months prior to their
158. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM
OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2002), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94
.pdf. Of almost 300,000 prisoners released in fifteen states in 1994, 67.5% were rearrested
within three years. Id.
159. See, e.g., ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 6 (“[N]one of the three [Arizona] institu-
tions studied in this report could provide recidivism data for prisoners released from
supermax units.”).
160. Gerald Gaes et al., Adult Correctional Treatment, 26 CRIME & JUST. 361, 402–03 (1999).
161. See Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1138.
162. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 41, at 20–21.
163. ELIZABETH CALVIN, NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, LEGAL STRATEGIES TO RE-
DUCE THE UNNECESSARY DETENTION OF CHILDREN 56–58 (2004), available at http://www.njdc
.info/pdf/detention_guide.pdf.
164. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 41, at 21.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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release.167 Between 1999 and 2004, the recidivism rate dropped al-
most 32 percent. Oregon’s recidivism rate—22.8 percent—was the
lowest of the forty-one states that the Pew Center studied.168
In addition to transition planning, educational and vocational
programs also reduce recidivism. Studies have shown that “adult ac-
ademic and vocational correctional education programs lead to
fewer disciplinary violations during incarceration, reductions in re-
cidivism, increases in employment opportunities, and to increases
in participation in education upon release.”169 Additionally, family
visitation decreases the risk that prisoners will reoffend.170 In sum,
minimizing restrictions during incarceration increases prisoners’
chances at successful reentry.171
In contrast, prisoners in solitary confinement are disadvantaged
because they have no access to the types of programming that have
been shown to reduce recidivism. They have “little to no access” to
work, substance abuse classes, vocational training, or education.172
Solitary confinement prisoners in Arizona’s Special Management
Units, for example, can only view education or rehabilitative pro-
gramming if they purchase a television, which many prisoners
cannot afford to do.173 They also have few opportunities “to learn
how to manage interpersonal conflict or to develop reentry plans,
which can be critical to successful transition back into society.”174
Similarly, juveniles reoffend less if they are placed in less restric-
tive environments. To start, young people placed in detention “feel
stigmatized because they have been labeled delinquent,” arguably
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that they will continue to offend
after release.175 Juveniles who are placed in detention have higher
rates of recidivism than juveniles who are not detained or who are
placed in community-based programs.176 Conversely, young people
in San Francisco’s Detention Diversion Advocacy Program—where
youth currently or likely to be held in secure detention are released
167. Id. at 20.
168. Id.
169. Gaes et al., supra note 160, at 402–03 (quoting J. Gerber & E.J. Fritsch, The Effects of
Academic and Vocational Program Participation on Inmate Misconduct and Reincarceration, in SAM
HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY, PRISON EDUCATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT 11 (1994)).
170. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1138.
171. See ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 60.
172. Id. at 13; see also Haney, supra note 9, at 127 (“[Prisoners in solitary confinement are]
denied access to vocational or educational training programs or other meaningful activities
. . . .”).
173. ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 33.
174. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1138 (citations omitted).
175. CALVIN, supra note 163, at 56.
176. Id. at 56–58 (discussing reforms in King County, Washington, New York City, San
Francisco, and Cook County, Illinois).
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to their homes and participate in community services with specific
objectives overseen by case managers177—reoffend at half the rate
of juveniles in detention or in the juvenile justice system.178 Given
that detention leads to recidivism for juveniles, solitary confine-
ment of juveniles may increase recidivism to an even greater
degree.
Research on recidivism for both juveniles and adults has shown
that rehabilitative and transition programming, as well as less puni-
tive and restrictive conditions, can help reduce recidivism. Solitary
confinement is clearly incompatible with the factors shown above
that reduce recidivism.
B. Explanations for Why Solitary Confinement May Affect Recidivism
One explanation for why solitary confinement may increase re-
cidivism is the “rage hypothesis,” which posits that prisoners
become so angry and frustrated by their incarceration in solitary
confinement that they gain an “active desire, or a heightened readi-
ness, to exact revenge on society.”179 Similarly, many prisoners
believe that they were placed in solitary confinement unfairly and
that they were treated in solitary confinement in an “extreme, un-
fair, and demeaning way.”180 “This sense of mistreatment and
procedural injustice” could result in higher rates of recidivism.181
Supporters of solitary confinement argue that it decreases recidi-
vism by deterring prisoners from committing future crimes,
particularly crimes where they would face another prison sentence
in solitary confinement.182 Proponents also argue that solitary con-
finement could help with rehabilitation because it “disrupt[s]
exposure to negative peer influences”183 in the general prison pop-
ulation and gives prisoners the “opportunity for reflection.”184
However, solitary confinement may increase recidivism by weaken-
ing prisoners’ social bonds and causing prisoners to become
177. RANDALL G. SHELDEN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DETENTION DIVERSION ADVOCACY: AN EVALUATION 5 (1999), availa-
ble at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/ojjdp_ddap.pdf.
178. BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE DANGERS OF DE-
TENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 6
(2006), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/1978.
179. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1138.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1137.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1153.
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enraged,185 in addition to the negative effects of solitary confine-
ment on mental health and the lack of rehabilitative programming
described above.186
Critics of solitary confinement argue that being confined without
human contact can “reduce social bonds to others and induce
strain and possibly embitterment and rage. It also may undermine
inmates’ beliefs in conventional moral codes and impede efforts to
prepare inmates for reentry.”187 Prisoners held in solitary confine-
ment, particularly if they are released directly into communities,
“might be too disoriented, jumpy, or hostile to cope with the chal-
lenges of society.”188
C. Quantitative Studies of Solitary Confinement and Recidivism
The notion that solitary confinement increases recidivism is not
merely theoretical. Two foundational studies that matched prison-
ers held in solitary confinement with prisoners held in the general
population found that solitary confinement increased recidivism.189
Daniel Mears and William Bales studied prisoners who had been
imprisoned for at least one year and who were released from Flor-
ida prisons between July 1996 and June 2001.190 The authors
compared recidivism rates by matching the 1,247 prisoners who
were incarcerated in solitary confinement191 with prisoners who had
been in the general prison population based on “past offending re-
cord, current offense, and behavior while incarcerated.”192 The
185. See supra Part I.D.2.
186. See supra Parts I.D, I.B.
187. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1153.
188. Lovell et al., supra note 25, at 639.
189. See Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1149–51; Lovell et al., supra note 25, at 649–50. A
third study found that solitary confinement correlated with an increased rate of recidivism;
however, this study did not pair the prisoners held in solitary confinement with prisoners
held in the general population based on likelihood of recidivism. MAUREEN L. O’KEEFE,
ANALYSIS OF COLORADO’S ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION iii, 25 (2005), available at http://cospl
.coalliance.org/fedora/repository/co:3048. This study in Colorado of 3,003 prisoners held in
solitary confinement between January 1995 and December 2003 found that the prisoners
released directly from solitary confinement to the community had recidivism rates of 66 per-
cent during the three years after release. Id. Prisoners who had been in solitary confinement
but were housed in general population before release had recidivism rates of 60 percent,
compared to general population recidivism rates of 50 percent. Id.
190. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1141.
191. Mears and Bales defined these prisoners as prisoners who had been in solitary for at
least ninety-one days. Id. at 1144.
192. Id. The study defined recidivism as a new felony conviction resulting in a sentence in
a local jail, state prison, or community supervision during the thirty-six months after the
prisoners were released. Id. at 1142.
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study found that 24.2 percent of the prisoners held in solitary con-
finement were reconvicted of a violent crime compared to 20.5
percent of prisoners held in general population193 and concluded
that solitary confinement “is associated with an increased risk of vio-
lent recidivism.”194
Mears and Bales posited that defiance theory may explain this
outcome because the increase in recidivism did not depend on how
long or how recently the offender had been in solitary confine-
ment.195 According to defiance theory, placing prisoners in solitary
confinement undermines their belief in the legitimacy of the prison
system, because they feel mistreated and that their placement is un-
fair.196 Mears and Bales noted that, although solitary confinement is
“arguably the most severe sanction” in prisons, it does not in fact
deter, and may instead increase, violent recidivism.197 They inferred
that solitary confinement “prevents inmates from sustaining or cre-
ating a social bond” and causes the “removal of positive stimuli,
imposition of negative stimuli, and introduction of barriers to
achieving goals”; its use therefore may increase violent offending.198
Similarly, a study from Washington State found that prisoners re-
leased directly from solitary confinement had a higher rate of
recidivism than prisoners who had been released from the general
population. Professor Lovell studied 7,248 men released from
prison in Washington State and compared prisoners released from
solitary confinement with those who were not held in solitary con-
finement.199 The study examined new felonies committed within
three years of release and found that prisoners who were held in
solitary confinement up until the point they were released from
prison had an increased rate of recidivism compared to those who
were not.200 These prisoners “committed new felonies sooner and at
higher rates” than similar prisoners who had not been held in soli-
tary confinement and prisoners who were not released directly
193. Id. at 1150–51. However, the study found that the amount of time prisoners spent in
solitary confinement and how recently the prisoners were held in solitary confinement did
not impact recidivism. Id. at 1151–52.
194. Id. at 1151.
195. Id. at 1156.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1154.
198. Id. at 1155.
199. Lovell et al., supra note 25, at 638, 649. Solitary confinement prisoners had been in
solitary confinement within four years of their release and had spent either a minimum of
twelve weeks in solitary confinement continuously or at least 40 percent of their sentence in
solitary confinement. Id. at 638. Nonsolitary confinement prisoners had spent no more than
thirty days in solitary confinement. Id.
200. Id. at 638, 649–50.
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from solitary confinement.201 Similarly to Mears and Bales,202 Lovell
paired the prisoners based on their criminal histories.203 Therefore,
the different rates of recidivism were caused by conditions in soli-
tary confinement and not by characteristics of the prisoners.204
These studies demonstrate that solitary confinement does not
help prisoners “develop[ ] effective, nonviolent strategies to
achieve goals or to manage interpersonal conflicts.”205 Rather, soli-
tary confinement may cause prisoners to become more dangerous
because of the mental health consequences, the lack of permitted
activities, and the dehumanizing treatment by prison guards.206 Soli-
tary confinement may also increase violent recidivism, particularly
for prisoners released directly from solitary confinement. Solitary
confinement certainly does not decrease recidivism and may in fact
increase the risk of reoffending. The harmful mental health effects
of solitary confinement and its negative impact on perceived institu-
tional legitimacy provide convincing explanations for these
findings.
D. Models for Reform
States house prisoners in solitary confinement at different rates
and for different reasons and amounts of time. States that have suc-
cessfully reduced their use of solitary confinement serve as models
for how states with large numbers of prisoners in solitary confine-
ment can similarly reduce their reliance on the tactic. The
percentage of prisoners in solitary confinement ranges by state
from less than 1 percent to 12 percent.207 California houses at least
11,730 prisoners in “some form of isolation,” and at least 3,808 Cali-
fornia prisoners are in isolation for an indeterminate amount of
time.208 In Texas, 4,748 prisoners are held in indefinite solitary con-
finement because they have been validated as gang affiliates. Some
of these prisoners have been held in solitary confinement for over
twenty years.209 In contrast, Minnesota holds prisoners in solitary
confinement for an average of only twenty-nine days.210
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
203. Lovell et al., supra note 25, at 642.
204. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1144.
205. Id. at 1155.
206. See Toch, supra note 23, at 378, 382.
207. Mears & Bales, supra note 22, at 1140.
208. Bauer, supra note 1.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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Furthermore, multiple states have removed prisoners with
mental illness from solitary confinement following class action liti-
gation and settlements.211 As a result, some states have created
intensive mental health treatment programs for these prisoners.212
New York and Mississippi, for example, have created “step-down
mental health units,” which are intensive treatment programs for
those mentally ill prisoners who have been excluded from solitary
confinement units.213 These examples show that states can success-
fully limit the use of solitary confinement, particularly for juveniles
and for the mentally ill.
Some prisons have had great success implementing more open
and social programs for housing prisoners. At Minnesota’s Oak
Park Heights maximum-security prison, prisoners have human con-
tact, natural light and sensory stimulation, and they are allowed to
exercise; few people are locked in their cells during the day.214
James Bruton, a former warden of the prison, explained: “[H]alf of
the people that you work with every day have killed somebody and
95 percent have hurt somebody, you better find a way every day for
them to get up in the morning and look forward to something posi-
tive or you’ve got big trouble.”215 This prison has succeeded in
treating prisoners humanely while maintaining prison safety. As a
result, there has not been a homicide in the prison in its twenty-
three years of operation.216
Missouri has implemented a decentralized, small-group correc-
tions system that focuses on rehabilitation for juveniles.217 The
model has resulted in low recidivism rates and has been “widely ac-
claimed as a common sense, research based approach” to juvenile
justice.218 Juveniles are placed in “homey, small-group setting[s]
that incorporate[ ] constant therapy and positive peer pressure
under the direct guidance of well-trained counselors.”219 The Mis-
souri Department of Youth seeks to provide the “least restrictive
environment” to all youth and uses isolation only as “an absolute
last resort.”220 Out of a total of seven hundred beds, only seven are
211. Presley v. Epps, 4:05-cv-148-JAD (N.D. Miss. 2005 & 2007); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.
Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
212. See Kupers, supra note 155, at 149–50; see, e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Office of Mental Health, 02 civ.4002-GEL (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (settlement).
213. Kupers, supra note 155, at 50.
214. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 60.
215. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
216. Id. at 61.
217. ISAACS & LOWEN, supra note 49, at 49.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 49–50.
524 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:2
in isolation rooms; during the last ten years, some of the state’s five
regions have not used their isolation rooms at all, and none of the
regions have used isolation more than five times.221
V. REFORM
As shown above, some states have implemented reforms that
have decreased the amount of time prisoners spend in solitary con-
finement, removed mentally ill prisoners from solitary
confinement, and reformed juvenile detention. The reforms imple-
mented in individual states provide a blueprint for reforms that can
be implemented across the United States through a federal statute
to decrease the number of prisoners placed in solitary confine-
ment, reduce the amount of time prisoners spend in solitary
confinement, and end the use of sensory deprivation. These re-
forms will greatly limit the number of prisoners subjected to solitary
confinement and counteract its harmful effects, including mental
health deterioration. Prisoners will have greater access to rehabilita-
tive programming and will have less likelihood of recidivism upon
reentry into communities.
A. The Feasibility of a Federal Statute
Congress should pass a federal statute222 incorporating the find-
ings of this Note, informed by the Vera Commission’s study223 and
ABA Standards,224 as well as by practices in Mississippi, Minnesota,
and Maine.225 This reform should be enacted through legislation
because it can result in the greatest number of specific changes to
the way solitary confinement is currently used throughout the
United States. The statute should use the Prison Rape Elimination
Act (PREA) as a model for enforcement. PREA requires states to
221. Id. at 50.
222. Alternatively, the Uniform Law Commission could draft a uniform statute. This alter-
native would have the disadvantage of allowing states not to adopt the law. However, the
process by which the Uniform Law Commission would draft the model statute would bring
favorable attention to this issue and might encourage adoption by states.
223. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 52–61.
224. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
(2011).
225. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CHANGE IS POSSIBLE: A CASE STUDY OF SOLITARY CON-
FINEMENT REFORM IN MAINE (2013).
WINTER 2014] Reforming Solitary Confinement 525
conform with its guidelines for reducing rape or lose 5 percent of
any Department of Justice grant funds that they receive.226
Prison litigation is difficult and, as a result, is an unlikely avenue
for securing meaningful reform. While litigation contributed to
closing the Tamms supermax and helped catalyze reforms in Missis-
sippi, federal courts have generally deferred to prison officials’
judgments about the use of solitary confinement, and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) restricts the impact of judicial deci-
sions on prison conditions more generally. The PLRA, enacted in
1996, limited the scope of consent decrees to “narrowly drawn” re-
lief that “extend[ed] no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right.”227  Under the PLRA, a prisoner must
exhaust all administrative remedies prior to suing prison officials,
and the prisoner cannot recover for mental or emotional harm un-
less the prisoner has also been physically harmed.228
Furthermore, the financial and public safety costs of solitary con-
finement provide strong policy grounds for a legislative remedy. A
federal statute is politically feasible—in fact, the Senate held hear-
ings on solitary confinement in June 2012.229 Furthermore, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons is currently reviewing its use of solitary
confinement, indicating that there is a growing political interest in
questioning the practice.230 A federal statute can most effectively
create positive changes for adults and juveniles in solitary confine-
ment in jails and prisons throughout the United States.
B. Recommendations
Reform efforts should reduce the duration of time a prisoner
may be held in solitary confinement and limit the types of prisoners
that can be placed in such conditions. Furthermore, solitary con-
finement should only be used to protect prisoners and not to
punish prisoners for breaking rules. Even if prisoners need to be
physically separated from others, sensory deprivation is always un-
necessary. Also, prisoners may only need to be separated from
specific people, rather than from the entire population. Indeed,
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 15607(c) (2006).
227. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
229. Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm.,
112th Cong. (2012).
230. Edith Honan, U.S. Bureau of Prisons to Review Solitary Confinement, REUTERS (Feb. 4,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-usa-prisons-solitary-idUSBRE91404L
20130205.
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prisoners in protective custody often do not need to be housed in
solitary confinement. Instead, these prisoners should be placed in
housing at “safe distances” from specific prisoners or groups of
prisoners.231
Prisoners should not be placed in long-term solitary confinement
as punishment. The Vera Commission cites “maintaining safety” as
the only permissible goal of solitary confinement.232 A prisoner
should not be put in disciplinary segregation if the violation did not
pose a safety threat; instead, prisons can address those infractions
by restricting certain privileges.233 Kupers recommends that prisons
should “emphasize rewards over punishments,” because the “puni-
tive prison milieu” is “entirely counter-therapeutic.”234 According to
Kupers, the “long-term static conditions” of solitary confinement
are ineffective at addressing violent behavior.235 Instead, prisoners
should be incentivized to reach “attainable goals” with increased
freedom and privileges, because “[h]aving no way to attain more
freedom . . . lead[s] to despair and desperate acts.”236
Even when prisoners must be physically separated from other
prisoners in order to ensure prison safety, this separation does not
require the “social and sensory isolation” that is far too common in
solitary confinement.237 Sensory deprivation is solely punitive; it
does not have any health or safety justification.238 Prisoners should
be provided stimulation including books, television, radio, and
communication and visits with family and friends.239 The Vera Com-
mission recommended that prisoners in solitary confinement be
provided “opportunities to fully engage in treatment, work, study,
and other productive activities, and to feel part of a community.”240
These recommendations counteract the sensory deprivation that re-
searchers such as Haney have found to be harmful.
231. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 14.
232. Id. at 53.
233. See id.
234. Kupers, supra note 155, at 59 (“[P]risoners are serving their sentence in prison as
their punishment. . . . They do not need to be further punished with inhumane conditions
and brutal abuse. In the case of prisoners with serious mental illness . . . a relative emphasis
on rewards over punishments is a prerequisite to therapeutic success.”).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 59–60.
237. Schlanger et al., supra note 6, at 24; see also Lobel, supra note 135, at 132 (“There is
simply no strong security need for the total social isolation that exists at some supermax
prisons.”).
238. Schlanger et al., supra note 6, at 24.
239. Lobel, supra note 135, at 132.
240. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 53.
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Solitary confinement should only be used as a last resort to pre-
vent prisoners from acting violently.241 In these situations, solitary
confinement should be used for less than twenty-four hours and
only in “extreme circumstances as a therapeutic intervention to sta-
bilize someone who is completely out of control and to prevent
harm to self or others.”242 Additionally, trained mental health pro-
fessionals should be involved throughout the process,243 and
prisoners should never be released directly from solitary confine-
ment into communities. Instead, they should undergo a
“transitional process” where the prisoners can “gradually in-
creas[e]” their interactions with prisoners and guards in order to
“become accustomed to living with others in a less controlled
environment.”244
C. Provisions of a Federal Statute
This Note proposes that the following text be included in a fed-
eral statute. The text aims to limit the use of solitary confinement to
certain conditions.
• Solitary confinement is defined as housing a prisoner in a
single cell for twenty-three hours per day, without the ability
to eat, exercise, or otherwise interact with other prisoners.
• Solitary confinement may only be used in prisons under the
following conditions:
° Violent prisoners may be placed in solitary confinement
for up to twenty-four hours under medical supervision as a
therapeutic intervention.
° Prisoners who have seriously injured other prisoners or
prison guards may be placed in solitary confinement but
must receive periodic reviews every thirty days, as well as
weekly mental health assessments.
• Prisoners may not be housed in solitary confinement as a
punishment for nonviolent infractions.
• Prisoners may not be housed in solitary confinement for
protective custody.
241. See id.
242. Id. at 58.
243. Id. at 59.
244. Id. at 57; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 224, at 43 (“[Prisoners] should be placed in a less
restrictive setting for the final months of confinement.”).
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• Prisoners in solitary confinement must receive access to
mental health care, mental stimulation, rehabilitative pro-
gramming, and family visitation and phone calls.245
• Prisoners who are mentally ill or under the age of eighteen
may not be housed in solitary confinement.
• Prisoners must receive transition programming when they
are released from solitary confinement into the general
prison population and when they are released from prison.
• Prison staff must be trained to recognize symptoms of
mental illness and to use alternative methods of addressing
prisoner behavior other than solitary confinement.246
CONCLUSION
Solitary confinement, like all prison policies, should be designed
to maximize public safety and not solely to punish prisoners. Stud-
ies have shown that solitary confinement results in mental illness
and appears to increase recidivism. Therefore, prisons need to dras-
tically reduce their populations in solitary confinement and the
amount of time they hold prisoners in solitary confinement. In-
deed, the most oppressive feature of solitary confinement—sensory
deprivation—is unnecessary.  Prisoners can be physically separated
from others in order to prevent violence without depriving them of
all sensory stimulation. Studies of prisons that have used solitary
confinement less frequently show that this action actually increased
public safety.
The statutory reforms proposed in this Note will decrease the
harmful effects that solitary confinement has on recidivism and
public safety by greatly decreasing the number of prisoners housed
in these conditions. Furthermore, the reforms will mitigate the
harms such confinement causes to prisoners by providing those in
solitary confinement with mental health treatment and sensory
stimulation.  Solitary confinement is inhumane and unnecessary,
and for the common sense reason that doing so would increase
public safety, Congress should pass legislation that limits the use of
solitary confinement.
245. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 224, at 64–67.
246. See Haney, supra note 18, at 965. This training will incorporate the philosophy of the
Oak Park Heights prison in Minnesota described above. See supra notes 214–16 and accompa-
nying text.
